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Bargaining and the Impartiality of the
Social Contract
Johanna Thoma, University of Toronto
Abstract
The question of what a group of rational agents would agree on were they
to deliberate on how to organise society is central to all hypothetical social
contract theories. If morality is to be based on a social contract, we need to
know the terms of this contract. One type of social contract theory, contrac-
tarianism, aims to derive morality from rationality alone. Contractarians
need to show, amongst other things, that rational and self-interested indi-
viduals would agree on an impartial division of a cooperative surplus. But
it is often claimed that contractarians cannot show this without introduc-
ing moral assumptions. This paper argues that on the right understanding
of the question contractarians are asking, these worries can be answered.
Without relying on moral assumptions, the paper offers a novel derivation
of symmetry, which is the axiom responsible for the impartiality of the most
famous economic bargaining solutions appealed to by contractarians.
1 Introduction
The question of what a group of rational agents would agree on were they to de-
liberate on how to organise society is central to all hypothetical social contract
theories. If morality is to be based on a hypothetical social contract, then we need
to know what the terms of this contract are. One type of social contract theory,
sometimes called contractarianism, aims to derive morality from rationality alone.
What contractarians need to show is that the rules that we commonly think of as
constituting morality would be agreed upon by rational and purely self-interested
individuals in a pre-moral context. In particular, contractarians have aimed to
show that rational and self-interested individuals would divide the fruits of coop-
eration in a fair or impartial way. After bargaining theory developed as a branch
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of game theory in the 1950s, a number of contractarians followed Braithwaite’s
(1955) suggestion and used solutions from economic bargaining theory to try and
show this. Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement (1986) was the most prominent and
elaborate such attempt. But the game theoretic analysis of the bargaining prob-
lem also gave rise to the worry that no determinate and satisfactory answer can
be given to the question of what rational, self-interested individuals would agree
on in a pre-moral context.
Any attempt at answering this question seems to be subject to one of three
criticisms: First, moral considerations may already have played a role in the de-
termination of the outcome of bargaining. This is a problem for contractarians,
because it means they failed their project of deriving morality from rationality
alone. Second, the outcome of bargaining may give weight to factors that are
morally arbitrary, and thus fail a requirement of impartiality. This is a problem
for contractarians because they will have failed to derive anything that is recog-
nizable as morality from their non-moral assumptions. If these two problems are
avoided, a third one seems to arise: There may be no unique rational outcome of
bargaining. Without making any normative assumptions, or arbitrary assumptions
about the bargaining process, the answer to what rational agents would agree on in
bargaining may have no determinate answer. These criticisms were most forcefully
made by Sugden (1990) and, more recently, Thrasher (2014).
This paper argues that there is a way of understanding the bargaining problem
that contractarianism sets itself, according to which all three problems can be
avoided. According to this understanding, we have the resources to show that
there is a unique outcome of bargaining, which can be derived without making
any moral assumptions, but which results in a rule for distributing the fruits of
cooperation which is impartial, and hence fulfils an important requirement of what
we think of as morality.
The first key to my resolution of the problem is to show that no standard
non-cooperative game can be used to model the process of bargaining if we make
the following two assumptions: Firstly, the process of bargaining is something
that is itself to be agreed on; And secondly, bargaining is completely costless. The
problem that is sometimes identified with this setup is that under these conditions,
rational agents may never reach agreement. It is here that I think a proper under-
standing of the question contractarianism is asking is needed, and this is the second
key to my resolution of the problem. The hypothetical question we should under-
stand contractarianism as asking is not ‘What would happen if rational agents
were to bargain?’, but ‘What would rational bargainers agree on, provided they
reach agreement?’. Agents are entitled to ask that question if they take agree-
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ment amongst rational agents to at least be possible, and if they already consider
it rational to cooperate. If that is the question, then we can justify bargaining
solutions by hypothesising an agreement point, and asking what this agreement
has to be like given that it commanded universal agreement from rational agents.
I will show that, in agreement with all the candidate fair bargaining solutions,
any such agreement will have to be Pareto efficient, symmetric, and thought of by
all agents as unique. This goes a long way towards showing that a principle that
captures an idea of impartiality can be derived from rationality alone, and hence
that the contractarian project is not hopeless.
2 The Contractarian Project
Contractarians like Gauthier, Narveson or Buchanan have traditionally aimed to
derive morality from rationality alone. To achieve this project, two important
conditions must be met: our starting point must be non-moral, and the principles
that derive from our theory must be recognisably moral, which, at a minimum,
means that they must be sufficiently impartial. Contractarianism takes the moral
sceptic seriously. It aims to justify morality to somebody who takes all her reasons
to be grounded in rational self-interest. The founding insight of contractarianism
is the following: Mutual advantage is possible if agents manage to constrain their
pursuit of self-interest somehow. And so constraint of the pursuit of self-interest
is ultimately in an agent’s interest. Contractarians argue that the constraints
that self-interested individuals thus have reason to follow turn out to be what we
commonly think of as moral constraints.
The founding insight that constraint of self-interest makes possible mutual
advantage goes back at least to Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651/2010). Today it
is often interpreted in game theoretic terms, in particular in terms of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma.1 If each individual maximises her personal gain in a Prisoner’s Dilemma
situation, the overall outcome will not be Pareto efficient: In fact, everybody
could be made better off if the individual agents could all commit themselves to
cooperate. And there are many other types of interaction that are structured
such that a constraint on individual utility maximisation can lead to an outcome
that is mutually beneficial, such as the production of public goods, or the use of
pooled resources. The more general point is that in strategic interactions, there is
no guarantee that Nash equilibria (which are usually taken to be the individually
rational outcomes of a game) will be Pareto efficient.
1See Gauthier (1969) for a reading of Hobbes’ Leviathan in game theoretic terms.
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Contemporary contractarianism is about how the benefits from cooperation in
interactions that are so structured can be reaped, and how they should be divided.
Seeing that the benefits to all from mutual constraint are large, Gauthier argued
that reason commands agents to give up what he calls the ‘presumption against
morality’:
In so far as [the parties] would agree to constraints on their choices,
restraining the pursuit of their own interests, they acknowledge a dis-
tinction between what they may and may not do. As rational persons
understanding the structure of their interaction, they recognize a place
for mutual constraint, and so for a moral dimension in their affairs.
[. . . ] Agreed mutual constraint is the rational response to these struc-
tures. Reason overrides the presumption against morality. (Gauthier
1986, p.9)
Note that Gauthier is not saying yet that it follows from the recognition that
mutual constraint is needed to reap the benefits of cooperation that it is rational
for agents to constrain their pursuit of self-interest. If we are happy to ascribe
rationality to collective agents, then in some sense it would be rational for ‘us’ to
cooperate. But that need not give the individual a reason to cooperate yet.
This is why the contractarian argument must proceed in two steps: At the first
step, we ask what division of the gains from cooperation it would be rational for
the involved parties to agree on. This is the question bargaining theory is supposed
to give the answer to. At the second step, the contractarian wants to show that it
is rational for agents to act according to such a hypothetical agreement. It is at
this second step that Gauthier provides his much-contested theory of constrained
maximisation. It aims to show that individuals in fact have a reason to do their
part to make cooperation possible, and hence de facto give up the pure pursuit of
the greatest satisfaction of their self-interest.
What I am interested in here, however, is the first step of the argument. It is
here that contractarians can use bargaining theory in order to answer the question
of how rational agents would agree to divide a cooperative surplus. In line with
the contractarian project, the agreement should be imagined to take place in a
pre-moral context. Bargaining, to the contractarian, is also hypothetical: We do
not in fact find ourselves in a pre-moral context, and we may not be perfectly
rational. Moreover, cooperation is not usually preceded by an explicit agreement.
And so we imagine agents who are about to cooperate wondering what division of
the cooperative surplus they would have agreed on had they bargained in a pre-
moral context under conditions of full rationality, and common knowledge thereof.
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To answer this question, economic bargaining theory seems well-suited. For the
contractarian project to succeed, the answer should correspond to a division that
is in some sense impartial and could be described as moral.
3 Axiomatic Bargaining Theory
Economic bargaining theory concerns the way (rational) agents divide, or should
divide goods amongst themselves, when all agents would be worse off if no agree-
ment was reached. This branch of game theory thus appears to have obvious
relevance for contractarians. Two different approaches can be distinguished: an
axiomatic approach, and a strategic one. The axiomatic approach specifies some
characteristics the outcome of bargaining should have in the form of a number of
axioms, and derives a unique bargaining solution from those axioms. The strate-
gic approach specifies more precisely the process of bargaining: most commonly,
it models it as an offer-counteroffer non-cooperative game, where the notion of
a Nash equilibrium or a refinement thereof is used to solve the game. This sec-
tion provides an introduction to the axiomatic approach, which is the approach I
ultimately want to defend. The next section will turn to challenges to the con-
tractarian use of bargaining theory.
The most famous axiomatic bargaining solution was offered by Nash (1950),
whose characterisation of the bargaining problem is still the starting point for most
of bargaining theory. Focusing on a two agent case, let us assume two agents a and b
have utility functions ua and ub. Each could adopt a number of different strategies,
and each combination of strategies affords them each a certain utility. We can then
define a feasible set of pairs of utilities (or outcomes) that the two agents could
bring about. Call this the bargaining set B, which we assume to be closed. This
set can be represented as an area in two dimensions, as in Fig. 1. When agents
can randomise over strategies, the bargaining set is always convex, because agents
can always achieve an outcome on the line connecting two other feasible outcomes
by randomising over the strategies that generate those. A bargaining problem is
now defined by a bargaining set and a disagreement point d. The disagreement
point is the set of utilities that the bargaining parties would walk away with if no
agreement was found.
Axiomatic bargaining solutions aim to specify what set of utilities rational
agents would agree on, using nothing but the bargaining space and the disagree-
ment point as input: They are functions F on (d,B). To find such a function, we
take for granted that agents will never agree on a set of utilities that affords either
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of them a utility smaller than that of the disagreement point. So we can focus on
the area S in Fig. 1.
B
ua
ub
d
Nash bargaining solution
S
.
.
Figure 1: A bargaining problem and the Nash bargaining solution
The Nash bargaining solution can now be derived from four axioms:
1. Invariance with respect to linear, strictly increasing affine trans-
formations: Let A(.) be a positive linear transformation. Then,
f(A(d), A(B)) = A(f(d,B)).
What this means is that if we rescale each agent’s utility function, the bar-
gaining solution should also merely be rescaled in the same manner. Im-
portantly, this implies that the bargaining solution cannot depend on any
interpersonal comparisons of utility.
2. Pareto efficiency: For every (d,B), there is no y ∈ B such that for every
agent i,
yi >= fi(d,B) and y 6= f(d,B).
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So, at the bargaining solution, it must be impossible to make one bargainer
better off without making the other worse off. Graphically, what this means
is that the bargaining solution must be on the right and top boundary of S,
which is often called the Pareto frontier.
3. Independence of irrelevant alternatives: Suppose (d,B1) and (d,B2)
are different bargaining problems such that B1 ⊂ B2 and f(d,B2) ∈ B1.
Then,
f(d,B2) = f(d,B1).
The intuition behind this is that alternatives which would not be chosen were
they available should not make a difference to what is in fact chosen.
4. Symmetry: Suppose S is symmetric in the sense that there exist utility
operators such that (ua, ub) ∈ S if and only if (ub, ua) ∈ S. In this case, the
solution f should be of the form (x, x), that is, a point on the line ua = ub.
So in symmetric situations, the agents should each receive the same amount
of utility.
Nash proved that the only function that satisfies all four axioms is the one that
maximises the so-called Nash product (ua − da)× (ub − db) subject to ua, ub ∈ S.
Graphically, the Nash solution can be found where the largest possible rectangle
in S touches the Pareto frontier, as in Fig. 1.2
The second most famous bargaining solution is the Kalai-Smorodinski, or KS
bargaining solution (see Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975). It shares Nash’s represen-
tation of the bargaining problem, and Axioms 1, 2, and 4. However, it replaces
Axiom 3 with an axiom we will call monotonicity. To define it, we first need to
define the ideal point c: For each bargainer, it specifies the maximum utility they
may receive if the other bargainer were to receive just the disagreement utility.
These utility levels are not jointly feasible, and so lie outside the bargaining set,
as can be seen in Fig. 2. Monotonicity now requires the following:
2Lensberg (1988) showed that the Nash bargaining solution can also be derived when we
substitute an axiom called ‘stability’ for the independence of irrelevant alternatives. This axiom
is often considered more plausible than independence of irrelevant alternatives, and claims that,
in a multiple person bargaining game, the bargaining solution must be such that, if we hold
the utility allocation to some players fixed and apply the bargaining solution to the subgame
involving the remaining players, those players must be allocated the same amount as when the
bargaining solution was applied to the original bargaining game.
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3*. Monotonicity: For any two bargaining problems (d,B1) and (d,B2) such
that B1 ⊂ B2, it should be the case that, for every agent i,
fi(d,B2) >= fi(d,B1).
The intuition here is that no player should get less as the bargaining space
is expanded.
Kalai and Smorodinsky proved that the unique bargaining solution that satis-
fies 1, 2, 3* and 4 is the one that lies at the intersection of the Pareto frontier and
a line connecting the disagreement point with the ideal point, as shown in Fig. 2.
B
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. KS bargaining solution
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Figure 2: The KS bargaining solution
The bargaining solution Gauthier presents in chapter 5 of Morals by Agreement
is formally equivalent to the KS solution, at least in bargaining that involves two
parties (see Gaertner 2006, p.142 ff.). He thinks that the outcome of rational
bargaining will be at the point of ‘minimax relative concession’, that is, at the
point where the greatest concession made by any of the bargainers is smallest.
Gauthier sets up the problem much like Nash does, with a bargaining space and a
disagreement point. He also appeals to a ‘claim point’ which is equivalent to the
ideal point in the KS solution. A relative concession is now defined in the following
8
way: Take any utility pair u in B. The relative concession that would be involved
in adopting u as a solution is for each bargainer i the difference between the claim
point utility ci and ui, relative to the difference between ci and the disagreement
utility di, or (ci − ui)/(ci − di). In a two-agent bargaining problem, the minimax
relative concession will also be found at the point where the line between d and c
crosses the Pareto frontier.
While there are some interesting differences between the KS and Nash bargain-
ing solutions, what I want to focus on here is the general approach they embody,
and the axioms they both share, in particular the symmetry axiom.3 The ques-
tion I want to address is how bargaining solutions of the type just described could
help the contractarian project of deriving morality from rationality. The next two
sections raise problems for contractarians who want to employ the bargaining so-
lutions in this way. In Sections 6 and 7, I will provide a defence on behalf of the
contractarian.
4 Norms or Partiality
A look at the standard interpretations of bargaining theory suggests that the con-
tractarian project is hopeless from the start. Contractarians want to use bargaining
theory to answer the question of what division of a cooperative surplus rational
agents would agree on in a pre-moral context. This concern means that they can-
not share what has become the dominant interpretation of axiomatic bargaining
theory. This interpretation sees axiomatic bargaining solutions not as predictions
of what rational agents will agree to do, but as attempts to capture what fairness
in bargaining consists in. In fact, it is common for economists to interpret ax-
iomatic bargaining solutions as those that would be picked by an impartial third
party. Take, for instance, Pfingsten and Wagener (2003):
In a cooperative bargaining problem, an element out of a set of feasible
utility vectors for a group of agents has to be selected. The selected out-
come is regarded as the cooperative agreement reached by the agents.
In the axiomatic approach, the outcome further is interpreted as the
recommendation which an impartial arbitrator who holds certain nor-
mative positions would give as to how the bargaining problem should
reasonably be solved. (p. 360)
3This is especially apt given the fact that Gauthier later gave up his original bargaining
solution and endorsed the Nash bargaining solution (see Gauthier 1993).
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If this is what axiomatic bargaining solutions do, they are clearly inappropriate
for the contractarian project. Contractarians want to answer the question of what
agreement rational agents will come to, not the question of how an impartial, and
morally motivated third party will arbitrate.
The other main interpretation of bargaining theory, in fact its original one,
does focus on the question of predicting what the outcome of actual bargaining
will be. But given that interpretation, economists have found it problematic that
axiomatic bargaining theory treats the process of bargaining essentially as a black
box. Axiomatic bargaining solutions formulate conditions on what the outcome of
bargaining will be like, but do not say how the parties will arrive at that outcome.
For those who think axiomatic bargaining theory is essentially about predict-
ing what rational agents would actually agree on in bargaining, the ambition is to
show that their preferred bargaining solution corresponds to the Nash equilibrium
in various different non-cooperative games that model the process of bargaining.
Nash himself declared this to be the goal of bargaining theory (see Nash 1953).
Hence this ambition is usually referred to as the ‘Nash program’. On this interpre-
tation, what I have called the strategic approach above is in fact preferable, but it
is hoped that an axiomatic bargaining solution can offer unification or a shorthand
for treating many different bargaining problems. However, in the following, I want
to show that the results from the strategic approach are not promising for the
contractarian project.
The overwhelming popularity of the Nash bargaining solution amongst
economists seems to stem from a model developed in Rubinstein (1982). It can be
used to show that the Nash bargaining solution corresponds to the perfect equi-
librium in an infinitely repeated offer-counteroffer game amongst rational agents
(see Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky 1986). In this game, one agent starts by
suggesting a division of some good. The other player can either accept, in which
case the game ends, or make an alternative offer for the first player to consider,
and so on. If bargaining takes time, and the bargainers discount future utility,
the first player will immediately offer a division which offers the second player just
enough to not continue negotiations – which, if both agents discount utility at
the same rate, and if the time each round takes approaches 0, will be the Nash
bargaining solution.4
This last qualification is important, however, and often ignored.5 The per-
4There are also non-cooperative implementations of the KS solution, but they involve much
more complicated procedures for bargaining. See, for instance, Moulin (1984).
5An unpublished manuscript by Joseph Heath made me aware of this point.
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fect equilibrium in Rubinstein’s model will generally be biased towards the more
patient agent if the bargainers discount future utilities at different rates. So in
a way, Rubinstein’s bargaining game supports only what is sometimes called the
generalised Nash bargaining solution. This solution includes parameters for each
bargainer representing their bargaining advantage and can reproduce such a bias.
That the outcome from bargaining must be a generalised Nash bargaining solution
follows from Axioms 1-3 above (see Binmore 2007, pp. 476 ff.). Only when the
symmetry axiom is added does the Nash solution (and thus a unique solution)
result. We could hence say that it is the symmetry axiom in particular which is
not supported by Rubinstein’s bargaining game.
The dependence on patience in Rubinstein’s bargaining game shows that the
bargainers’ equal rationality may not cancel all advantages in bargaining, as Nash
(1953) suggested. And it is bad news for contractarianism: While there are no
hidden moral assumptions in this reconstruction of bargaining, the result does not
turn out to be impartial in a way that resembles morality. If contractarianism
employed Rubinstein’s prediction of what rational agents will agree on, patient
individuals would turn out to be systematically advantaged in cooperative schemes.
But that does not look very much like morality, and contractarianism will have
failed. Moreover, a dependence on patience is a feature that is most likely shared
by all bargaining games where bargaining is potentially extended in time, but can
be ended by agreement. All such bargaining games thus seem badly suited for the
contractarian project.
One may think that games that have a predetermined and known end point
could serve the purposes of the contractarian better. Such games may either be
alternating in the way that Rubinstein’s is, or involve simultaneous offers. Alter-
nating offers games with a known end point again would not help the contractarian.
In these games the last agent would always accept any offer that is minimally bet-
ter than the utility at the disagreement point. In that case the other agent could
end up with almost everything, which is hardly impartial. The other possibility
is to model bargaining as a game that ends with simultaneous offers being made.
Take, for instance, a game where agents get what they claim just in case the si-
multaneous offers made at the end of negotiations are compatible, or otherwise
walk away with nothing. This is what is sometimes called a game of pure coordi-
nation. Sugden (1990) claims that such a game of pure coordination is in fact the
best interpretation of the game that contractarians like Gauthier have in mind.
An analysis of this game prompts him to argue that Gauthier is not warranted in
the assumption that there will be a unique outcome of bargaining. Indeed, it can
be shown that in such a game, there are infinitely many Nash equilibria, namely
all divisions that are Pareto efficient (see Nash 1953, Schelling 1959). This again
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is bad news for contractarianism. The fact that there are many Nash equilib-
ria means that no bargaining solution in particular is supported by this analysis.
Many outcomes seem compatible with the players’ rationality, and the bargainers
then still face the problem of how to pick an equilibrium.
Maybe, however, the axioms of axiomatic bargaining theory can be understood
as expressing what guides equilibrium choice in such cases. One way this could
be done is if we understood the axioms as telling us what equilibria are focal in
the sense that Schelling (1960) describes. Focal points specify the strategies that
appear the most natural or salient to the agents, and capture what they expect the
other agents expect them to do. If this is what axiomatic bargaining theory gave
us, it would again serve a role which can not be reduced to the strategic approach.
The problem for contractarians here is that, given their project, they would have
to give some account of why their preferred bargaining solution is focal which does
not appeal to a social norm that could be understood to be moral in any way.
It is sometimes claimed that what helps agents to coordinate on an equilibrium
in a pure coordination game is a common understanding of what would be the
fair outcome (see Binmore 2005, p.23). But of course this is the kind of focality
contractarians cannot appeal to. It presupposes an idea of fairness and hence
bargaining would not take place in a pre-moral context.6
Now imagine a truly pre-moral context where there are no norms about how
to divide gains from cooperation in general. Even before considering the particular
axioms that actually go into the bargaining solutions, it is hard to see why there
should be any rules as to what equilibrium is focal that hold independently of the
details of the case. For instance, in some cases, there may be possible equilibria
which involve everybody receiving an equal amount of resources, even though, due
to differing utility functions and disagreement utilities this does not correspond
to any of the bargaining solutions. The simplicity of this solution may make it
focal for the bargainers. Without any kind of notion of fair division, it seems that
what is focal will depend on such contextual features. And then the strategy of
interpreting axiomatic bargaining theory as specifying what is focal in a pre-moral
context seems hopeless from the start.
We have now canvassed the standard ways of modeling bargaining as a non-
cooperative game, and the result holds little promise for the contractarian project.
The solutions of these games seem to fall into three categories:
6For some contractarians, this may not be as much of a problem. Binmore (2005) and Skyrms
(1996), for instance, provide an evolutionary account of the social contract which permits for the
co-evolution of norms of bargaining and the social contract itself.
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(i) The solution is not impartial in the way Gauthier wants it to be. This is
the case for the most well-known models of the strategic approach, such
as Rubinstein’s, or when a context-dependent idea of focality is used for
equilibrium selection.
(ii) The solution was derived from some moral assumptions, for instance when
existing fairness norms are used to predict equilibrium selection.
(iii) There is no unique solution, such as, for instance, in a simultaneous offer
game of pure coordination.
All three options imply that contractarianism fails. In the first case, it fails
because what results from bargaining does not resemble what we understand as
moral; in the second case, it fails because we do not start from non-moral as-
sumptions; and in the third case, it fails because there is no definite answer to
the question of what rational bargainers would agree on in a pre-moral context,
and thus an important element in contractarianism would be missing. So the
strategic approach, like the ‘fairness interpretation’ of axiomatic bargaining the-
ory, also doesn’t hold much promise that bargaining theory can deliver an impartial
bargaining solution derived from rationality alone. All in all, it seems like con-
tractarians can’t use standard bargaining theory to produce a unique bargaining
solution without appealing either to norms or producing a partial result.
5 Symmetry and Uniqueness
The argument of the last section proceeded without discussing the actual properties
of bargaining solutions. Once we look at those, more specific arguments why the
Nash and KS solutions are unsuited for the contractarian project apply. It has
frequently been claimed that the axioms that go into these bargaining solutions do
as a matter of fact express normative commitments that go beyond the rationality
of the players. In a sense, the fact that a straightforwardly normative interpretation
of bargaining theory became so popular later on is testament to the normative
flavour of these axioms. In particular, symmetry – which is an axiom in virtually
every bargaining solution – has been claimed to express some idea of equality, and
is thus an axiom that is not legitimate in a pre-moral context as contractarianism
envisages it. Schelling (1959) and Harsanyi (1961) argued early on that symmetry
is not justified from the point of view of rationality. Recently, Thrasher (2014)
argued that this axiom should have no place in contractarianism. The argument
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appears to be simply that under most conceptions of what happens in bargaining,
many divisions of the cooperative surplus seem to be equally possible from the
point of view of rationality. In fact, any division which gives each more than the
disagreement utility seems rationally defensible in many games.
That it smuggles in normative commitments has also been claimed of what is
often understood to be the functional equivalent of the symmetry assumption in
Gauthier’s theory, namely his equal rationality assumption, and what he takes it
to imply (see, for instance, Goodin 1993). Gauthier claims that assuming equal
rationality implies the following:
Since each person, as a utility-maximizer, seeks to minimize his con-
cession, then no one can expect any other rational person to be willing
to make a concession if he would not be willing to make a similar
concession. (Gauthier 1986, pp. 143-144)
This principle seems to go beyond what follows from common knowledge of ra-
tionality. Suppose I am bargaining with one other person, whom I know to be
rational, in a simultaneous offer game as I just described it. There seems to be
nothing irrational about not being willing to accept less than 80% of the coopera-
tive surplus. If the other person were to claim only 20%, for instance, that would
be the only rational thing to do. And it is not irrational for the other person to
accept 20% given that I am taking 80%. This is what it then means to maximise
utility. This just repeats again that in such a game, any Pareto efficient division
is a Nash equilibrium and hence consistent with common knowledge of rationality.
According to critics, what Gauthier seems to be describing is the idea that it would
be in some sense unfair to demand of another person to give up more than one
would be willing to give up oneself. But that is the kind of normative commitment
that he wanted to avoid.
Given that many outcomes appear to be equally defensible in this type of
bargaining from the point of view of rationality, Thrasher argues that even if the
symmetry axiom didn’t smuggle in normative commitments, it would still be ar-
bitrary. He contends that the only reason the axiom is used is to artificially create
uniqueness of the bargaining solution. We have seen above that this is indeed the
effect it has. Without symmetry, Nash’s axioms result in the generalised Nash
solution, which has free parameters and hence does not determine a unique solu-
tion. Sugden (1990) provided a similar argument. He showed that symmetry can
in fact be derived from uniqueness. Uniqueness itself is essential for contractarian-
ism. Without uniqueness, contractarianism does not work: The question of what
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rational agents would agree to do in a pre-moral context would have no determi-
nate answer. And such indeterminacy in the antecedent is commonly thought of
as making any counterfactual with that antecedent false (see, for instance, Ha-
jek 2007). But such a counterfactual plays a key role in contractarianism. Now
while uniqueness is essential for contractarianism in this way, Sugden claims that
it cannot simply be assumed, but rather must be demonstrated.7
6 The Contractarian Bargaining Problem
The lessons from standard interpretations of bargaining theory and from critics
seem clear: A unique bargaining solution is either partial, or will be derived from
norms. The symmetry axiom, in particular, is either normative, or an arbitrary
device to create uniqueness. Still, I argue that contractarianism has the resources
to respond to these criticisms. In the following, I want to argue that the symmetry
axiom can be defended without appeal to moral assumptions. In particular, I want
to show that the criticism I described in the last section is founded on a misun-
derstanding of the question contractarians like Gauthier are asking. Symmetry is
defensible when the question is not ‘What will happen when rational agents bar-
gain?’, but rather ‘What division of the cooperative surplus will rational bargainers
agree on, if they manage to reach agreement?’
As an initial response to the argument of section 5, I first want to argue
that contractarians should in fact hold it to be impossible to model the bargaining
process with a standard non-cooperative game. And this is because any such model
would presuppose some specific procedure that bargaining will follow. How could
a contractarian be justified to presuppose some bargaining procedure? Either she
would have to simply impose it, or she would have to provide an argument for
why rational agents would choose to follow that procedure. Imposing a particular
procedure for bargaining seems arbitrary given the contractarian project. We have
seen that different bargaining procedures will lead to different outcomes. The
contractarian wants it to be the case that everybody has a reason grounded in
self-interest to comply with the agreement the theory isolates. If the contractarian
imposed some specific procedure for bargaining by which one agent receives less
than he would have under some other, equally arbitrary, procedure, her claim
to having given everybody such a reason grounded in self-interest alone would
7Sugden provides a convincing argument that what he calls the ‘principle of rational deter-
minacy’ is not generally true. That is, it is not true in all games that the rationality of the
agents guarantees that there is a single determinate outcome to the game. However, this is still
consistent with it being the case that in the bargaining game, in particular, the principle holds.
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be weakened. Why should any agent have a reason to follow this hypothetical
agreement, rather than the hypothetical agreement that would have been struck,
had a different, perhaps more favourable bargaining procedure been imposed? It
seems more in line with the contractarian project to instead leave the choice of
bargaining procedure up to the agents themselves. But in this case, no bargaining
procedure seems like the unique rational choice. Given that different bargaining
procedures lead to different outcomes, the choice of bargaining procedure itself then
becomes part of the bargaining problem. Anybody who tries to model bargaining
as a noncooperative game thus has nothing to hold on to.8
My solution to the problems raised in sections 5 and 6 requires another as-
sumption about the bargaining procedure. And that assumption is that bargaining
is completely costless, also in terms of time. Along with several contractarians,
we assume that bargaining could in principle go on indefinitely without any costs.
And so nobody is under any kind of pressure to come to an agreement early.9
Of course, the costlessness assumption is unrealistic: In real life, prolonged
bargaining will turn out to be costly in a number of ways. Still, even though this
situation is unrealistic, I don’t think the idea of rational choice in this situation
is incoherent in the way Kraus and Coleman (1991) argue it is. They argue that
without there being any cost of bargaining, there is no basis for choice anymore.
Since stopping to bargain to enjoy the fruits of cooperation can’t be taken to be
8Arguably, Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement leaves the bargaining procedure open to the
agents. He does describe bargaining as a 2-stage process, whereby agents first claim their ideal
utilities, and then offer concessions until a feasible division has been reached (p.131). The process
of making concessions is not well described, however. It is not clear, for instance, whether the
agents see what concessions everybody else made, whether they make concessions simultaneously,
whether they have to concede anything each round, whether their concessions have to become
larger every round of bargaining, etc. Later on, Gauthier claims that bargaining will follow
Zeuthen’s principle (proposed in Zeuthen 1930), which claims that the person with the smallest
relative concession has to concede and make a larger concession each round. However, this is
not a further description of the structure of the bargaining game, but rather a principle that
Gauthier takes to be implied by the bargainers’ equal rationality. Most of what Gauthier says
about bargaining in fact follows the axiomatic approach in leaving the process of bargaining
unspecified. He starts off much like Nash, by imposing some conditions on the final bargaining
solution (p.130). It must be a point on the Pareto frontier, and it cannot require any interpersonal
comparisons of utility. And his more formal derivation of the principle of minimax relative
concession focuses on the properties of various outcomes, namely on whether some division of
the cooperative surplus is one that all bargainers are rationally willing to entertain.
9Gauthier introduces this assumption, almost as an afterthought, on p. 156 of Morals by
Agreement. This feature of Gauthier’s set-up is ignored by Sugden, whose argument that unique-
ness cannot be presupposed by Gauthier relies on a reading on which the agents play a game of
pure coordination with a predetermined end-point (in which case there are infinitely many Nash
equilibria).
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an opportunity cost of bargaining (i.e. a cost involved in foregoing some good),
it seems like what is bargained over couldn’t be of value to the agents. It is true
that on the model I propose, delaying getting one’s share from bargaining is not
an opportunity cost of bargaining. But agents are still aware that they will never
get the benefits if they never agree, and they can take this to be a bad outcome.
So it’s not the case that the bargainers have nothing to gain from bargaining.
The fact that the costlessness assumption is unrealistic does also not neces-
sarily speak against it. After all, we are also assuming that bargaining takes place
in a pre-moral context, which is also something none of us ever face. There are
two reasons one might give for why a costlessness assumption is appropriate for
the kind of bargaining problem contractarians set themselves. Firstly, the decision
of how the benefits from cooperation are to be divided up is so important that any
cost of delay through prolonged bargaining is not in proportion to what is at stake.
The second justification one might give is that contractarians want to isolate the
concept of a purely rational bargain. When agents ask themselves what agreement
they would have struck concerning how to divide up the cooperative surplus, what
they are interested in is then only what results from the agents’ equal rationality,
and their respective interests insofar as these concern the good to be divided up.
The costs to bargaining might then be judged irrelevant to the concept of a purely
rational bargain.
If the costlessness assumption does not seem well-founded, the following at
least shows this: Firstly, it is possible to derive a unique and impartial bargain-
ing solution without making normative assumptions. After all, the costlessness
assumption is not a normative assumption. And secondly, since the costlessness
assumption is doing most of the work in the following derivation, more atten-
tion should be paid to it, both by contractarians themselves, and by critics. The
contractarian project depends on a proper defence of this assumption.
There were two reasons why in section 4, modeling the bargaining process
led to predictions that are not impartial: Firstly, bargaining is modeled by a
procedure which advantages some agents; And secondly, patience generally helps
the bargainer. Given the costlessness assumption, and the assumption that the
bargaining procedure is itself to be agreed on, neither should be an issue for the
contractarian. But if we grant these assumptions, what is going to happen in
bargaining? If it is unclear how bargaining will proceed, there is no clear way
to model bargaining with the tools of non-cooperative game theory. And so non-
cooperative game theory cannot provide an answer anymore. Intuitively, at least,
it is not clear anymore whether rational agents will ever agree in such a context.
There seems to be no reason why the bargainers could not go on each claiming the
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full cooperative surplus indefinitely. It seems like we have removed any reason for
the bargainers to stop bargaining. Things seem even worse when we consider the
fact that there is no predetermined procedure for bargaining which could guide
the bargainers to agreement. Indeed, the fact that they will have to settle on a
procedure of how to bargain may set off an infinite regress: The bargainers will have
to use some procedure to decide how to proceed in bargaining. If this procedure is
to be accepted by all, all need to agree on how to proceed in bargaining. But how
are they going to agree on that? And so on. This regress further raises doubts
that rational agents will ever manage to come to an agreement.
So now the problem is no longer only that the outcome from bargaining may
be indeterminate. Now one of the possibilities of what might happen doesn’t even
involve any agreement. In fact there is a worry that bargaining indefinitely is what
is bound to happen in this situation. Or, foreseeing that there is never a reason to
stop bargaining, the agents foresee that there will never be agreement and don’t
even start to bargain. So even though the bargainers do have something to gain
from bargaining, their rationality may stand in the way of them ever receiving
those benefits.
But now I think it helps to think again about the founding motivation of
contractarianism: Mutual advantage is possible if agents manage to mutually con-
strain the pursuit of their self-interest. Thus mutual constraint is ultimately in
everybody’s interest. Contractarians like Gauthier take this to imply that it must
be rationally possible for a group of agents to reap those benefits. A theory of
rationality which makes it rationally impossible for agents to reap these benefits
can’t be the right theory of rationality. In line with this reasoning, one of the as-
sumptions in Gauthier’s derivation of the principle of minimax relative concession
is that every agent thinks that there is a feasible outcome that everybody would
be willing to entertain - that is, agree to provided everybody else does (p.143).
This implies that agreement is actually possible - for instance if the agents have the
same conception of what this feasible outcome is. Gauthier defends the assumption
that each thinks agreement is possible as follows:
For cooperation to occur, all must agree on an outcome (or joint strat-
egy) represented by a feasible point in outcome-space. Any person who
supposes that there is no feasible concession point on which rational
persons can agree is denying that there is any way in which those ra-
tional persons can co-operate. But each recognizes that everyone finds
it rational to co-operate. (p.143)
This assumption is crucial in Gauthier’s derivation, and may even be his
18
one departure from traditional rational choice theory in the bargaining context.
What he is saying here is in effect that a failure to do one’s part to make agreement
possible will always be irrational. However flawless an agent’s reasoning who thinks
that agreement is impossible, her belief is not compatible with knowledge of the
other agents’ rationality. Rational agents must be willing to agree to at least one
division that they think all others will also be willing to agree to. There must be
something wrong with any theory of rationality that told us that agents take it to
be impossible to agree, and thus never bargain.
Still, this assumption does not quite solve our problem yet. Even if all take
agreement to be possible, it may still also be possible that they never agree, maybe
because they have different conceptions of what a feasible agreement point would
be. The question of what would happen if rational agents were to bargain under the
circumstances described may still have no clear answer. Now I think a closer look at
what kind of question contractarianism is asking helps. Remember that bargaining
theory is supposed to only solve the problem of what terms of cooperation agents
should use. It is not supposed to solve the problem of how it can be rational for
agents to comply with the hypothetical agreement. And so we can assume that the
person who is asking the question of what terms of cooperation to use is already
willing to cooperate, convinced that non-cooperation is irrational. But if that is
so, the question contractarianism is asking should not be ‘what would the outcome
of bargaining be?’. It should be, rather, ‘what division of the cooperative surplus
would we have agreed on?’. One way of reading this has the inquirer assume that
agreement would definitely have been found. Now given the fact that it is possible
that nothing is ever agreed on, we may think that the question is misguided. But
there is another way of reading the question, namely as asking ‘If we had come
to agreement in bargaining, what would this agreement be?’ This question is
the appropriate one for contractarians to ask, because the person who asks the
question of what agreement hypothetical bargaining would have led to is already
willing to cooperate. All she wants to know is what precise terms of cooperation
to abide by. She wants to know what the rational agreement is, and thus, if
sometimes bargaining between rational individuals does not lead to agreement,
this is irrelevant to her concerns.
7 A ‘How Possible’ Story about Agreement
If what I just described is the question we are asking, the classical axiomatic
bargaining solutions again become defensible. The kind of argument we will have
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to provide given the setup of costless bargaining and the nature of the question
we are asking is a ‘how possible’ argument. For the reasons given above, we can
no longer specify some game and solve it for its Nash equilibria. Instead, we will
have to hypothesise that there are divisions of the surplus on which agreement is
possible, and ask what needs to be true of these divisions in order for agreement
on them to be compatible with the bargainers’ rationality and common knowledge
thereof. This approach is more akin to the axiomatic approach in bargaining
theory, and I want to show that this procedure can provide a rational, rather than
a moral justification of the contested symmetry axiom of axiomatic bargaining
theory.
Before providing a more formal argument, let me stress that it seems intuitive
that if there will be agreement in a context of costless bargaining, the agreement
will be in some sense impartial. As we have seen, it seems puzzling how agreement
could be reached at all in this context. But if agreement is in fact reached, then
an impartial division seems like the only plausible candidate. Any agent who
takes herself to be disadvantaged relative to another in some proposed bargain
can costlessly delay agreement indefinitely, in the hope of being the advantaged
party at some point in the future. So it seems like agreement could never be
reached on a partial solution. It is only an impartial solution that blocks this kind
of reasoning. In the following, I want to show more formally that any agreement
point in the set-up we described will have to be Pareto efficient, symmetric, and
thought of by all agents as unique.
Let’s assume there are n agents, and a bargaining space S of feasible utility
allocations to the n agents. All agents are utility maximisers, and care only about
their own utility. Both the bargaining space, and the players’ rationality are
common knowledge. Each agent has beliefs about what allocations are feasible as
agreements, that is, that she thinks all agents would be willing to agree to. Let
Ki be the set of utility allocations that agent i thinks are feasible as agreements.
We have said that all agents think that agreement is possible, and so Ki must
be non-empty for all i. Now utility maximisation and the setup of the problem
demand the following principle:
R: No individual i is willing to agree to a utility allocation u =
(u1, u2, . . . , un) ∈ S if she thinks that there is another utility allocation
u′ ∈ Ki such that u′i > ui.
In other words, no agent is willing to agree to a utility allocation if she thinks
that a utility allocation which leaves her better-off is also feasible. The rationale for
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this principle is that if an agent thinks that agreement on some utility allocation
is feasible, then there will at some point be the chance for her to in fact agree
to that utility allocation. Given that there is no cost to delaying agreement, she
is willing to wait for that opportunity whenever she can expect to gain from it.
Common knowledge of rationality implies that every agent knows that all other
agents follow R.
We now stipulate an agreement point a∗ = (a∗1, a
∗
2, . . . , a
∗
n) ∈ S. It is a utility
allocation that all agents have in fact agreed to. The first thing that we can
now show is that a∗, if it is a feasible allocation point, must be Pareto efficient.
Intuitively, the argument is that, if a∗ is acceptable to all, everybody should also
be willing to agree to a Pareto improvement to a∗. But then those who would
benefit from the Pareto improvement should not in fact agree to a∗, but wait
for the opportunity to agree to a Pareto improvement on a∗. If a∗ is a feasible
agreement point, it must thus be Pareto efficient.
More formally, suppose there was a utility allocation a′ ∈ S such that a move
from a∗ to a′ would constitute a Pareto improvement. Then there must be at least
one agent h for whom it holds that a′h > a
∗
h, while it is true for everybody that
they receive no less in a′ than in a∗. This is just what it means for a′ to be Pareto
superior to a∗. Seeing that everybody only cares about their own pay-off, which
they want to maximise, everybody who receives no less in a′ than in a∗ would
agree to a′ if they agreed to a∗. And so everybody must be willing to agree to a′
if they agreed to a∗: Agreement on a′ is feasible if agreement on a∗ is feasible. It
is known that a∗ is a feasible agreement point, and so a′ must also be a feasible
agreement point. Given that everybody’s rationality is common knowledge, h must
know all this. But then, by R, she could not rationally agree to a∗. She knows
that a utility allocation where she does better than a∗ is feasible. And hence she
waits for the opportunity to agree to that utility allocation. Hence a∗ is not a
feasible agreement point. By assuming that a∗ is both a feasible agreement point
and not Pareto efficient, we have derived a contradiction. And so, if a∗ is in fact
an agreement point, it must be Pareto efficient. Given everybody’s rationality is
common knowledge, everybody knows that any possible agreement point must be
Pareto efficient.10
The next thing that can be shown is that when agreement is reached, all
agents must think of that agreement point as the only feasible agreement point.
Evidently, once agreement on a∗ is reached, it must be true that all agents believe
that a∗ is a feasible agreement point, that is, for all i, a∗ ∈ Ki. But suppose that
a particular agent k thought that a different agreement point a+ 6= a∗ was also
10Note the similarity to the Coase Theorem (Coase 1960).
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feasible. Now if she herself did better in one of the two utility allocations than in
the other, then she could not think of both of them as feasible, since she herself
would only agree to the one in which she does better. Suppose that a+k > a
∗
k. In
this case, k would violate R if she thought that a∗ was feasible. k should never
have agreed to a∗ because she thinks that she can do better. Now suppose that
a+k < a
∗
k. In this case, learning that a
∗ is a feasible agreement point, according to
R, k can no longer think that a+ is feasible: She herself would not agree to a+,
knowing that a∗ is feasible. It remains to consider the case where a+k = a
∗
k. Now,
given that a∗ is Pareto efficient, there must be at least one agent j 6= k for whom
a+j < a
∗
j . But given that a
∗ has been agreed on, j also knows that a∗ is a feasible
agreement point, and, by common knowledge of rationality, k knows that j knows
this. But if j knows that it is possible for her to get a∗j , by R, she would never
agree to a+. Knowing that, k can no longer think that a+ is a feasible agreement
point. It follows that once agreement is reached, everybody thinks that the actual
agreement point is the only feasible agreement point.
We have shown that once agreement is reached, every agent must think of the
agreement point that was reached as the only feasible agreement point. It does
not follow from this that agreement is in fact only feasible on one particular agree-
ment point.11 We can hence not directly invoke Sugden’s argument that derives
symmetry from uniqueness. This is not a problem, however, since symmetry can
also be derived from the belief that any agreement that is reached must be unique.
Suppose that in a symmetric bargaining problem, the agreement point a∗ wasn’t
symmetric, so that some agent g gets more than another agent l. Let a− be the
same as a∗ except that the payoffs to g and l have been exchanged. By hypothesis,
a−l > a
∗
l . But then, by R, l cannot believe that a
− is feasible, given that a∗ has
been agreed on. But is that belief justified, given that a∗ is believed to be feasible?
It seems not. If it was feasible to reach agreement on a∗, then it should also be
feasible to reach agreement on a−. Given g and l are both equally rational and
have the same amount of utility to win or lose from bargaining, we can assume
that l would agree to a∗ if and only if g would agree to a−. But if both players
are aware of this, by R, l should never agree to a∗, and g should never agree to
a−. And thus, given a symmetric bargaining space, the agreement point cannot
be asymmetric.
The argument hinges on the assumption that if agents have a reason to believe
that one allocation in a symmetric bargaining problem is feasible, then they should
11We only characterized what the agents’ beliefs have to be like when agreement is reached,
but not how the convergence of beliefs on what agreement is feasible is supposed to be achieved.
Uniqueness would require that beliefs can only converge on one particular utility allocation,
which we have not shown.
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also believe that the ‘mirror-image’ allocation is feasible. I think that this is
the truth in Gauthier’s remarks on what follows from the equal rationality of
the agents. With that assumption in place, we can also state the argument as
follows. We note that any asymmetric solution to a symmetric bargaining problem
is distinct from its ‘mirror image’ allocation. But then there will be agents who
do worse under one of the allocations than under the other and vice versa. These
agents would only ever agree to the one in which they do better, but not the other.
And so asymmetric solutions to symmetric bargaining problems cannot be feasible.
What we have now given is a ‘how possible’ argument for the symmetry of
bargaining solutions, and to some extent, their uniqueness. We have assumed,
with Gauthier, that agreement is possible, and that every agent takes it to be
possible. We have then asked what must be true of any stipulated agreement
point, given that agreement was reached under circumstances where there is no
pressure on anybody to end the bargaining process early. Under these circum-
stances, everybody is willing to wait out for a different agreement under which
they will receive more, provided they think such an agreement is feasible. Under
these assumptions, we have established that any agreement must be Pareto effi-
cient, symmetric, and thought of by everybody as unique. While this falls short
of establishing the actual uniqueness of the agreement point, all that is needed to
provide a full-fledged and determinate answer to the question of what division of
the cooperative surplus rational agents would agree to is a defence of either the
independence of irrelevant alternatives, monotonicity, or some other axiom that
establishes a unique bargaining solution. But this should be the subject of intra-
mural discussion between contractarians. What we have given here is a derivation
of the axiom that is in large part responsible for the impartiality of the different
bargaining solutions from purely non-moral assumptions. And so we defended
the contractarian project against the charges described in sections 4 and 5. If
infighting between different but similar bargaining solutions can be resolved, we
can derive a unique agreement point which is impartial from assumptions that are
non-moral.
8 Conclusions
Bargaining solutions such as the Nash or KS solutions are now mostly interpreted
as formalising the notion of fairness in cooperation, and justified by testing them
against our intuitions about fairness. Since contractarians need their bargaining
solution to pin down what the only rational outcome in bargaining is without
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making any moral assumptions, their proposed bargaining solution requires a dif-
ferent kind of defence. That it may be difficult to provide such a defence became
apparent in the first part of this paper: all standard non-cooperative games that
have been used to model bargaining between rational individuals either produce
no unique result, require normative assumptions to be solved, or have solutions
that are not impartial enough to be the basis for a contractarian theory of justice.
This paper offered a defence of the contractarian project against this criticism.
The argument relied on two key preliminary steps. The first is the assumption that
hypothetical bargaining is open-ended: not only can the agents themselves decide
what procedure to use in bargaining; bargaining is also completely costless so that
agents have no problem continuing the bargaining process indefinitely. The second
is that if we take it as a given that it must be rationally possible for us to cooperate
in some form, contractarians can disregard the possibility that agents never reach
agreement in the hypothetical bargaining process. Contractarians should be inter-
ested in what will be agreed on, given there is agreement. And so they can simply
stipulate an agreement point. But if we can stipulate an agreement point, we can
establish that any such agreement point must be symmetric, Pareto efficient, and
thought of by the agents as unique. And thus the most normatively loaded axioms
of the standard bargaining solutions have been derived from non-moral assump-
tions. The contractarian needs to show that the result of the agreement of rational
and self-interested individuals will be impartial moral rules. The argument in this
paper goes a long way towards showing that this can be done.
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